On lunatics and cranks

Last week a friend shared a screenshot of an interesting theory propounded, as all world-changing theories are, in someone’s Instagram comments. You know the Vikings? The old Norse raiders who terrorized all of Europe from the Baltic and the North Sea to the Mediterranean, laid the foundations of Russia, served generations of Byzantine emperors, and traded as far away as Baghdad and the Caspian Sea? Made up. Totally made up. A fictional scapegoat for the crimes of Christians. The Vikings were invented, you see, to cover up for the Knights Templar everywhere the Templars went a-pillaging.

It shouldn’t be hard to see problems with an idea like this—which shouldn’t even really be dignified with the name “theory.” In addition to all the basic factual stuff like when these groups lived and were active and where they lived and were active, it neglects the veritable Himalayas of evidence supporting the existence of the Vikings: letters, chronicles, charters, linguistic evidence, archaeological evidence on three continents… Name a field of historical investigation and there is a branch dedicated to the Viking Age. Just to deal with texts alone, Michael Livingston’s recent study of one battle between the Anglo-Saxons and a Viking coalition, Brunanburh, used sources in Old English, Latin, Irish, Old Norse, and Welsh to reconstruct what we can know about it. Was all of this manufactured and planted later?

Whatever. Anyone proposing an idea like this doesn’t know how we know what happened in the past; they don’t know how history works. Perhaps they should get into filmmaking.

But the hypothetical culprit behind Viking violence in this particular theory reminded me of a favorite line from Umberto Eco that I once shared here many years ago. This passage comes from Eco’s novel Foucault’s Pendulum:

“A lunatic is easily recognized. He is a moron who doesn’t know the ropes. The moron proves his thesis; he has logic, however twisted it may be. The lunatic on the other hand, doesn’t concern himself at all with logic; he works by short circuits. For him, everything proves everything else. The lunatic is all idée fixe, and whatever he comes across confirms his lunacy. You can tell him by the liberties he takes with common sense, by his flashes of inspiration, and by the fact that sooner or later he brings up the Templars.”

— Umberto Eco

“[E]verything proves everything else” should be a recognizable pattern nowadays. A theory like the one above is lunacy.

Revisiting Eco’s diagnostic passage also brings to mind one in which Joseph Bottum defines the crank, a type similar to but with important differences from the lunatic. Here’s Bottum with his useful working definition that manages to nail three common crank fixations, all of which have gotten plenty of play recently:

“There are three infallible signs of the crank—that oddball, goofball sort of person who mutters, as he walks along, about how he’s grasped the key to everything. The first is that he has a theory about the Jews. The second is that he has a theory about money. And the third is that he has a theory about Shakespeare.”

— Joseph Bottum

To put the distinction another way, there’s no arguing with a lunatic, but a crank will argue you under the table. Not that a crank is any nearer the truth than the lunatic, but whatever fixation a crank has will lend itself to tabulation, nitpicking, and a kind of big-data hairsplitting that feels like thought in a way the world-bestriding historical revisions of the lunatic do not. That guy you know who thinks the CIA shot down Flight 370 in order to cover up the fake moon landing on behalf of Satan-worshiping lizard people is a lunatic. That guy you know who posts three times a day about crypto—or the Fed, or the Mossad, or “the Zionists,” or, yes, Shakespeare—is a crank. And there’s a reason you avoid engaging.

For a case study in anti-Shakespeare crankery, see Jonathan Kay at the National Post here. (And I would recommend Kay’s book Among the Truthers for a broad and insightful study of lunatics, cranks, and other similar species.) And here’s a short reflection from Sonny Bunch, inspired by Bottum’s line about cranks and overlapping somewhat with Chesterton’s observations, about how conspiracy theories can reveal a lot—just not about the subject of the theory.

I posted that Eco quotation in the early days of this blog as an addendum to a long passage from Chesterton about the biased of motivated thinking of cranks. You can read that here. For crank-on-crank combat, see the world-class observer of the scene, Charles Portis, in Gringos, here.

CS Lewis, 60 and 125 years later

Last week I was too busy critiquing Napoleon to note the 60th anniversary of the death of CS Lewis here—one more thing to hold against Napoleon—though I did manage to slip through an Instagram memorial. Fortunately, today is Lewis’s 125th birthday, so in the spirit of commemoration and appreciation here are a few good things I read from others to mark sixty years since his passing.

CS Lewis (1898-1963)

At her Substack Further Up, Bethel McGrew has an excellent reflection on her own lifelong connection to Lewis and the way the endless quoting of his work risks simplifying him into a generator of therapeutic fortune cookie messages:

Lewis is much-quoted, for good reason: He is prolifically quotable. (There are also a few famously misattributed quotes, like “You are a soul, you have a body,” which no doubt would have annoyed him greatly.) And yet, there’s a paradoxical sense in which his quotability almost risks watering down his true value as a thinker. There’s a temptation to see Lewis as a one-stop “Christian answer man,” the super-Christian who always had the perfect eloquent solution to every Christian’s hard problems. To be sure, he came closer than most Christian writers to providing a sense-making framework for hard problems. But even he wouldn’t claim to have “solved” them. Indeed, his very strength as a writer was that his work swung free of top-down systematic theologies which claim to provide comprehensively satisfying theological answers.

She continues with a particularly poignant example from A Grief Observed. I recommend the whole post.

At Miller’s Book Review, another outstanding Substack, Joel Miller considers Lewis’s humor in the years just before his death, when failing health should have robbed him of his joy:

Sayer says that Lewis “never lost his sense of humor.” Indeed, he was famously good natured, even amid dire circumstances. On July 15, 1963, he suffered a heart attack and slipped into a coma. Friends feared the worst; some came and prayed; a priest gave the sacrament of extreme unction. Amazingly, an hour after the sacrament, Lewis awoke, revived, and asked for a cup of tea.

True to form, he found a joke in it. “I was unexpectedly revived from a long coma,” he wrote Sister Penelope, an Anglican nun with whom he frequently corresponded. “Ought one honor Lazarus rather than Stephen as the protomartyr? To be brought back and have all one’s dying to do again was rather hard.”

Miller also reflects on his own experience of reading and rereading Lewis. Like Miller, I came to Narnia late, well after many of Lewis’s other books, and I have also read and reread Lewis’s work many times. As Miller notes, though Lewis did not expect his work to be remembered, it’s a safe bet that readers like him and myself will continue to find and appreciate Lewis’s work.

At World magazine, Samuel D James has a good short essay on Lewis as a prophet:

Precisely because Lewis knew that the claims of Christianity were all-encompassing, he recognized that no civilization that abandoned it could function. This was not because Lewis desired some kind of baptized Anglo-Saxon ethnonationalist state (born in Belfast, Lewis never forgot the high cost of religious intolerance), but because modern man’s alternatives were quite literally inhumane. Lewis saw from afar, with striking prescience, that humans had no choice but to retreat from personhood if they wanted to escape the implications of Christian revelation.

At The Critic, Rhys Laverty elaborates more deeply on the same theme:

At the close of the Second World War, Lewis was one of a number of Christian intellectuals (alongside Jacques Maritain, Simone Weil, W.H. Auden, and T.S. Eliot) who had begun to consider what world the Allied powers would now make for themselves. Lewis saw a future in which the rejection of transcendent values would allow a technologised elite to re-make nature as they saw fit, ultimately overthrowing human nature itself — a process made possible through the ideological capture of education.

Laverty invokes not only The Abolition of Man, as James does, but Lewis’s dramatization of those ideas in the final novel of The Space Trilogy, That Hideous Strength, in which the elite of the National Institute of Coordinated Experiments (NICE) pursue genuinely diabolical technological progress and control:

With N.I.C.E, Lewis anticipated our contemporary technocracy. “Progress” is our unquestionable sacred cow, and its faithful handmaiden is technology. Whether we are tearing up areas of ancient natural beauty in order to build infrastructure supposedly intended to help protect the environment, prescribing new cross-sex hormones and surgery to enable greater self-realisation, or developing artificial wombs which we unconvincingly insist will only ever be used for the care of premature infants, there is now no technological innovation that we will deny ourselves today if it supposedly contributes to the nebulous “future good of humanity”.

It is only Green Book education which makes N.I.C.E possible. If truth, goodness, beauty, and so on are merely relative then there is nothing to rein in man’s “conquest of nature”. His scruples are mere hang-ups to be educated out. He will be driven by pure reason or pure appetite, with no sentiment to regulate their respective metrics of efficiency or pleasure. 

I commend all four of these essays to y’all. They’re good celebrations of a worthy life and a worthy mind, and have gotten me wanting to reread pretty much all of my Lewis shelf. Which might take a while.

Let me conclude with a brief personal reflection of my own. Growing up in the environment I did, I don’t remember ever not knowing about Lewis. He was a byword for intelligent Christian thought, something that stood out to me among the generally anti-intellectual atmosphere of fundamentalism. My earliest accidental exposure was probably the BBC Narnia films. I recall catching a long stretch of The Silver Chair on PBS at my grandparents’ house one morning. As dated as those adaptations are now, it scared me. But it also riveted me, and stayed with me. Indeed, The Silver Chair may still be my favorite of the Narnia books.

But it was a long time before I actually read anything by CS Lewis. My parents got me a set of his non-fiction books at our church bookstore when I was in high school. I started The Great Divorce one night and something about the Grey Town and the bus ride into the unknown disturbed me so much that I put it away. That nightmare quality again. But when I tried the book one sleepy Sunday afternoon in college—my way prepared by Dante, whom I discovered my senior year of high school—I read the entire thing in one sitting. It’s still among my favorite Lewis books.

From there it was on to The Screwtape Letters and Mere Christianity and The Four Loves. I read The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe and liked it but returned to the non-fiction, devouring Lewis’s essays on any topic. After college I read The Space Trilogy—all three in one week, if I remember correctly—and delved into his scholarly work: An Experiment in Criticism and, crucially, The Discarded Image. I also read as much about Lewis as I read by him, and dug into the works that Lewis loved only to discover new loves of my own, most notably GK Chesterton.

Only with the birth of my children did I seriously return to Narnia, and now I genuinely love them. My kids do, too. They’ll be yet another generation entertained and blessed by Lewis’s work.

He is one of the few authors who has grown with me for so long—guiding me, enlightening me, introducing me to great literature, telling me entertaining and meaningful stories of his own, and deepening both my understanding and my faith. Where the fictional Lewis of The Great Divorce meets George MacDonald as his heavenly guide, the Virgil to his Dante, Lewis could well play that role for me.

On this, his 125th birthday, just over a week from the 60th anniversary of his death, I am more grateful than ever for CS Lewis. RIP.

Napoleon

Scope: Napoleon Bonaparte (Joaquin Phoenix) invades Egypt in Ridley Scott’s Napoleon

Back in the summer I briefly meditated on scope and depth as storytelling principles. Not every novel or film can afford to have scope, the sweeping vision of epic fantasy and high historical drama, but every story should have depth. Should. Ridley Scott’s Napoleon may be the ultimate example of scope without depth.

Beginning with the execution of Marie Antoinette during the Jacobin Terror, Napoleon follows its main character (Joaquin Phoenix) through his first campaigns as a young officer—storming the British-held fortress at the port of Toulon, invading Egypt—and into the political machinations, plotting, and blunt strong-arming that elevated him not only to highest ranks of the French Republic’s army but to the throne as Emperor. During this ten-year segment, he meets, woos, marries, is betrayed by, and himself betrays the older widow Joséphine de Beauharnais (Vanessa Kirby), the first act of a tumultuous and unpleasant lifelong relationship.

The second half of the film, covering another eleven years, charts Bonaparte’s greatest triumphs—victory over the Austrians and the Holy Roman Empire, alliance with Russia—as well as his two downfalls: first after the disastrous invasion of Russia and his exile to Elba, second after his return to the throne and “the Hundred Days,” the campaign that ended at Waterloo and with a final exile to the farthest reaches of the South Atlantic. It also dramatizes the collapse of his marriage to Joséphine, his remarriage to an Austrian archduchess, and Joséphine’s loneliness and death. A brief coda on Saint Helena, subtly suggesting the theory that Bonaparte was poisoned, ends the film.

In all, Napoleon covers 27 years in the life of one of the busiest, most important, and most complicated figures in modern history. And with Ridley Scott directing, the film has scope in abundance. From the drawing rooms of Paris and the deserts of Egypt to the battlefields of central Europe and the freezing steppes of Russia, and with energetic, powerful battle scenes featuring hundreds of extras, galloping horses, and thunderous explosions, Napoleon is visually stunning.

What Napoleon does not have, unfortunately, is depth. It can only offer a whirlwind tour of some of the most important moments of Bonaparte’s long and brutal career—Toulon, the Royalist uprising of 13 Vendémiaire, the Egyptian campaign, his coronation, Austerlitz, Borodino, Waterloo, and negotiations galore—as well as a breathless, simplified account of his tempestuous and unfaithful marriage to Joséphine.

This would not in itself be bad, if it could at least suggest depth, but most of the events of the film have been simplified to the point that they misrepresent what happened. One would think, based on Napoleon, that Bonaparte abandoned the campaign in Egypt just because he was jealous of the cheating Joséphine, or that he was deposed and exiled by his own people immediately after returning from Russia. In fact, he was far from done—the biggest battle ever fought in Europe to that point occurred between his Russian campaign and exile, a battle that doesn’t even make the casualty list in the closing credits.

All of which could, again, be forgivable, since Scott was apparently more interested in crafting a character study punctuated by violent battles, but the characters themselves are presented in the same shallow manner. This is especially evident in the film’s treatment of the central relationship between Bonaparte and Joséphine. Though just as canny, calculating, and amoral a user as Bonaparte, the film presents Joséphine as a doe-eyed victim. Bonaparte, once the naïve puppy dog stage of his obsession with Joséphine has been ended by her infidelity, spends the rest of the film as a randy nerd. (This particular aspect is not inaccurate but it’s hardly the full picture.) These were two nasty, deeply unpleasant characters, and a deeper, more honest portrayal could have made an interesting study of a relationship that genuinely deserves the cliché “toxic.”

Part of the problem may be cuts made to get the film to theatrical length. Scott has, annoyingly, already trumpeted the existence of a theoretically superior director’s cut that is more than two hours longer and that apparently includes more relationship drama. That could well smooth out the choppy middle of the film and allow more time for us to understand these two.

But another part of the problem is Joaquin Phoenix as Bonaparte. To my surprise, I wasn’t bothered by Phoenix’s age (he’s about the age now that the real Bonaparte was when he died, making him more than twice the right age for the siege of Toulon at the beginning of the film), though Kirby’s far more youthful looks obscure the fact that Joséphine was the older and worldlier of the two by six years. What did bother me was that Phoenix’s performance never gelled into a believable portrait of a single individual. In some scenes he’s brilliant, capturing his insight, confidence, and bluff, rough humor, and his scenes with Joséphine are realistically uncomfortable, vacillating as Bonaparte does between childish infatuation, coldness, frat boy lust, and cruelty. But missing from the entire film is any sense of the charisma and drive that united all of these other Napoleons and that unmistakably come through in any book about the man. Napoleon tells you a lot about Bonaparte, but not why anyone would follow him, much less admire him.

Again, perhaps more footage would help, though one wishes the director would just release a coherent film and not lean on the crutch of the after-the-fact director’s cut.

The film’s lack of depth also makes some of the few events it does depict incomprehensible. I am no expert on the Napoleonic era, but I wondered as I watched how well someone without even my limited understanding would be able to follow it. Not well, as it turns out. Two of the three other people I watched it with said they found it “confusing.”

I’ve dwelt on Napoleon’s flaws, but I actually did enjoy it. It’s well-shot, with moody cinematography, and certain sequences are as good as anything else Scott has directed. The scenes at Toulon, the Russian campaign—especially the burning of Moscow, when Bonaparte finally comes up against an enemy he doesn’t understand and can’t intimidate—and the Waterloo scenes are the best in the film. I had also heard that the film was unexpectedly funny; it was, with some authentically Gallic barbs exchanged. I also liked much of the score, including this haunting Kyrie that plays over the (wildly inaccurate and exaggerated) Austerlitz scene, though the film also uses the most recognizable track from Dario Marianelli’s Pride & Prejudice score twice, and in tonally inappropriate ways. As the film belongs strictly to Bonaparte and Joséphine, few other characters get a chance to shine, but Rupert Everett’s Wellington dominates his few scenes late in the film. I would like to have seen more of him. The climactic Waterloo sequence also offers a simple but effective dramatization of how the pressures of time and geography shaped Bonaparte’s choices that day, as well as the outcome.

You’ll notice that I haven’t said much about the film’s accuracy. I don’t see why anyone should bother. Not long after I critiqued some of his remarks on historical accuracy to HistoryHit’s Dan Snow, Scott demonstrated his contempt for history even more clearly in a New Yorker profile. His film deals loosely with the facts, giving Joséphine, in just one obvious example, an extra year of life so that her death coincides with Bonaparte’s return from Elba. Napoleon offers an adequate bullet-list overview of its subject’s career but shouldn’t be trusted on any specifics.

That’s a shame, a missed opportunity, but unfortunately Scott decided at some early point in his career that he need not take pains over story and Napoleon finds him true to form, arrogantly indifferent both to the truth and to the people who care about it.

Despite it all, I found Napoleon entertaining and mostly liked it. If it had depth to match its scope, and if it had a less promiscuous relationship with the facts (taking a cue from its subjects, perhaps?), it might have been great. But as it is, it’s a sometimes rousing entertainment with a few standout action scenes and a curious central performance, but little else—an interesting footnote to a storied career. Not Scott’s Waterloo, but perhaps his Saint Helena.

Poetry of reinforcement

From Tom Shippey’s preface to his new translation of Beowulf, in which he notes some of the strange poetic artifacts of the poem’s alliterative form and explores their deeper implications—both for the poem’s original audience and for us:

King David as Anglo-Saxon bard in the Vespasian Psalter

One may sum up by saying that, rather oddly, the words in the poem which receive the greatest sonic emphasis are sometimes the ones which carry the least information. They are there to help the poet with the first of his major aims: which is, one might say, to maintain the beat and the meter of his poetic lines.

This seems a rather humble aim to us, for our idea of poetry is that its wording should be exact, unexpected, provocative—to paraphrase the Savage in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, who has just been introduced to Shakespeare—words which make you feel like you'd sat on a pin. But we emphasize novelty, originality, surprise: and accordingly we fail to feel the power of reinforcement, familiarity, recognition. And it is this which satisfied the poet's second major aim: to express the ethos of a social group.

The modern vision of the poet as an outsider speaking truth to power and challenging norms is not only historically recent but a sadly narrow and limiting vision of what poetry does. It requires a posture of continuous antagonism to everything that grows both tedious and phony. The stereotype of the tiresome and hypocritical modernist poet and his or her predictably transgressive free verse exists for a reason.

But worse, this vision of poetry and the poet warps the interpretation of the great poetry of the past. People go galloping off in search of the hidden subversion in Homer or Beowulf and, having searched long enough and screwed their jeweler’s loupe of critical theory tightly enough into their eye, find it. Turns out these poets were just like the longhairs at the campus poetry slam. But, satisfied with presentist political interpretations, they miss what’s actually going on—and the chance to encounter people radically unlike themselves.

Good poetry can challenge, certainly. But I’d argue that the most effective and lasting prophetic verse challenges from within a culture—thus the entire power of the Old Testament prophets—rather than from some self-congratulatory political margin. But just as often, if not more so, good poetry reminds its audience of who they are. Remember, it says, This is us. This is what we love. This is what we must protect. And, with striking frequency, This is what we have lost. Consider the worlds in which the Iliad and Beowulf were composed and the poetry of reinforcement and shared love and loss makes much more sense.

Recovering the ability to “feel the power of reinforcement, familiarity, recognition” may prove a crucial part of the modern man’s great spiritual task.

Shippey has an online Beowulf “masterclass” coming up at the beginning of December. I’ve already signed up. It should be well worth your while if you’re interested in this period and its poetry. You can find information about the class here.

Homer's imaginative sympathy

Earlier this week I ran across a book called The World of Herodotus at our local used book store. The author sold me on it instantly—Aubrey de Sélincourt, whom I know best as a translator of Livy and Herodotus for Penguin Classics in its early years. When I got home and was leafing through it, I happened across this passage, which expresses what is to me one of the strongest and characteristic features of Homer’s poetry:

“[T]he burden of the poem is the universal tragedy of Man; none the less, the fact that one can ask it indicates another profound and beautiful trait in Homer—the breadth of his imaginative sympathy.”

— Aubrey de Sélincourt

Is the Iliad the tragedy of Hector, who is killed, or of Achilles, who loses his friend—and is himself doomed, as we know, to early death? The question is idle, because the burden of the poem is the universal tragedy of Man; none the less, the fact that one can ask it indicates another profound and beautiful trait in Homer—the breadth of his imaginative sympathy. It is no part of Homer’s purpose to exalt the Greeks at the expense of the Trojans or the Trojans at the expense of the Greeks. He does not take sides. If Mycenae is ‘golden’, Troy is ‘holy’; if Achilles is ‘splendid as a god’, Hector is ‘glorious’, and Priam as well as Agamemnon is shepherd of his people. We are moved by the grief of Achilles when his friend is killed, but we are moved as deeply by the noble scene in which the King of Troy humbles himself to come to Achilles’ tent and beg for the body of his son. Greeks and Trojans—all are men, splendid in manhood, and the poet looks upon them with benign and indifferent love. They fight to the death, for it is the nature of men to do so—of men proud of their strength and skill, hungry for honour and fame, glorying in the sunlight and the world of sense, but doomed so soon to fall like the leaves of a tree and to go down into the eternal darkness. It is a view of life stripped of complexity, bare of speculation, unburdened by any mystery but the ultimate mysteries of beauty and of death.

I’ve taken pains to explain Homer’s fair and sympathetic presentation of both sides of the Trojan War—his concern being less with political rights and wrongs or regional loyalty and more with arete regardless of who demonstrates it—to my students for many years. This puts it beautifully.

I especially like how de Sélincourt talks of sympathy rather than its weakling modern cousin, empathy. Sympathy, which is not coincidentally a Greek word, is what Homer evokes so powerfully throughout, even—or perhaps especially—in those vignettes that introduce us to a character as he’s dying violently. Remember that, at root, sympathy means to feel with or even to suffer with, and who hasn’t finished the Iliad feeling as if he’s suffered alongside Hector, Achilles, and Priam?

I have to anticipate at least one modern rejoinder, though, provoked by de Sélincourt’s repeated use of the word men there. Wouldn’t a dead white man’s sympathies be narrow and bigoted? Aren’t the Iliad and the Odyssey just war stories for boys? Aren’t the main characters all afflicted with toxic masculinity? Certainly the readership for the present fad of feminist parallax fiction based on Greek myth would think so, to judge by the way they talk about these stories. To which I can only say that they haven’t read Homer very well, if at all, and that it’s not Homer whose “breadth of imaginative sympathy” is limited.

If Homer, in his world, could reach across boundaries and battle lines to feel and understand—and to make his audience feel and understand—I think he deserves as much or better from us.

500 blog posts!

Not quite a year ago I celebrated the fifth anniversary of this blog. I wasn’t sure, at that time, precisely how many posts I had on here, but knew it was just over 400. I’ve kept better track since then, and as far as I can tell this post is the 500th in just under six years.

To celebrate, I looked back at my analytics from the beginning of this site in December 2017 to the present to see what the biggest hits have been. It’s an interesting grab-bag—a few things I consciously tried to make as appealing as possible, a few things that made almost zero impression when I first wrote them but slowly gathered momentum over years, a couple that have crept into the top Google results for very specific terms, and a few personal pieces that made it big in surprising ways, including getting linked from a New York Times op-ed. I offer these up as a top-ten, with a little commentary.

10 most popular blog posts to date

Ranked in order of popularity:

• Willy Wonka’s Hidden Nazi Joke, May 2, 2020—A favorite bit of trivia that I wrote about in the structure of clickbait as an experiment. Apparently it worked. This is far and away the most popular thing I’ve ever posted here and is the top Google result for several related searches. Three and a half years on and I can still count on it going viral on Facebook or Reddit a couple of times a year.

• Kingdom of Heaven, March 26, 2018—The most popular—and probably the best—of my short-lived Historical Movie Monday series, this post has gotten a steady drip of traffic for five and a half years. I still refer back to it myself, as I recently did when responding to Ridley Scott’s ideas about history and historical accuracy.

• Jon Daker, RIP, February 24, 2022—I was as surprised as anyone that this post blew up. When I found out that internet legend Jon Daker had died early last year, I was moved to pay tribute and reflect a little on what we can both enjoy and learn from his public access TV humiliation. It seems to have resonated with a lot of people. Note that this is easily the most recent post on this list and you should get some idea of the speed with which it spread.

• My top nine Civil War novels, August 2, 2018—A personal favorites list that I published ahead of the release of Griswoldville. Needs updating but still gets traffic. Every once in a while someone looks at Griswoldville after reading it, but only every once in a while. I guess I should try the Willy Wonka clickbait approach.

• What’s wrong, Chesterton? February 28, 2019—I wrote this one day after driving back and forth between two campuses of my college. The famously misattributed/misquoted Chesterton line “Dear sirs: I am” had crossed my mind and I determined to find the source for myself, definitively. When I did, I transcribed and shared the whole original source so that it’d be more easily accessible. To my surprise, a lot of people were also keen to find it. Even more surprising, this post is now in the footnotes or bibliographies of at least four books (here’s one, and here’s another that came out just last month), which I accidentally discovered early this year, and was cited in a David French op-ed in the New York Times this summer.

• I’m not saying it was aliens, August 9, 2018—A slightly labored reflection on the pseudo- or ersatz-religious role played by aliens in many popular imaginations. An important idea to me, but perhaps not expressed as well as it could be. I’ve been considering revisiting this topic one of these days, especially considering how much more I hear about Joe Rogan, Graham Hancock, and the pyramids than “Ancient Aliens” now.

• I’m not saying Ancient Aliens is racist… November 6, 2020—Curiously, despite a gap of more than two years this post only has a few hits less than the one above, meaning that these two, which both play on an old meme, are almost tied in this top ten. This one has gotten more traffic in less time thanks to a few prominent shares on Facebook and Twitter and the attention given to pretty much any accusation of racism. As it happens, I think the racism of ancient astronauts theories is an accident born of their chronological snobbery (as Charles Portis noted in Gringos), which I tried to suggest in this post.

• The Winter War, May 14, 2018—Another Historical Movie Monday post, one made possible by the loan of a DVD copy of this hard-to-find Finnish war epic from a Finnish coworker who has now retired. A seriously impressive and hard-hitting movie that I hope this post has made more people seek out. Now if some enterprising home media company would just release a good Region 1 Blu-ray…

• Jefferson on ignorance and freedom, October 3, 2019—A short reflection on a relatively well-known passage from one of Jefferson’s late letters. I’m glad this one has (again, unexpectedly) gotten so much attention, because the quotation is often garbled or misattributed and I think it’s an important idea well worth meditating on.

• Hacksaw Ridge, April 16, 2018—One of the last Historical Movie Monday posts before that series petered out, a post that I remember getting little response at the time but which snuck into the top ten most popular posts on the blog over the last five years. A good movie I need to revisit.

Ten most popular blog posts of the last year

You might note a kind of inverse recency bias in the top ten list above, as older posts have had more time to collect hits and work their way up in Google search results, which is still where I get most of my traffic. But I’m also struck that it’s not the most representative sample of what I typically post here. To get a better glimpse, to give more recent posts a chance to shine for anyone who hasn’t looked at them, and to unnecessarily drag out this celebration, here are the ten most popular posts from the last year, a top ten I’m pretty proud of:

• Borges on the two registers of English, June 7, 2023—A response to a clip of William F Buckley and Jorge Luis Borges discussing the relative strengths of English and Spanish on “Firing Line,” this clip got picked up by two much more popular blogs (one on linguistics, one on Catholic homeschooling) and a professor with a lot of Facebook followers and really blew up. I really enjoyed these reflections so I’m glad others have found them enlightening.

• Frozen II’s big dam problem, December 13, 2022—This post started as an e-mail to my friends at Before They Were Live, a Disney animation podcast, and turned into a protracted grumble about one of the many things in Frozen II that don’t make sense and why it’s not just an artistic failing.

• Notes on rereading Storm of Steel, December 3, 2022—Exactly what it says on the tin: a less structured series of observations and reflections based on my first reading of Ernst Jünger’s great World War I memoir since grad school. Storm of Steel is an astonishingly powerful book that, like its author, has often been misrepresented. I hope those who have stumbled across this post have found it helpful, and that if they haven’t read the book they do after reading these thoughts.

• Orwell, Camus, Chesterton, and bad math, March 16, 2023—2+2=5 is a commonplace example of denial of reality. It’s strongly associated with Orwell, but when the author of an essay I came across suggested that Orwell got it from Camus, I had to go back further and suggest that one or both of them were riffing on Chesterton. This post has gotten interesting traction in the months since I shared it.

• On the term “Anglo-Saxon,” November 11, 2022—One of the most important posts, to me, in the last year, a response of the foolish, politically-motivated movement to avoid or censor the term “Anglo-Saxon” as racist.

• History must be written forward, May 10, 2023—A short reflection on historical perspective and presentism inspired by a passage in the introduction to a history of Germany that I didn’t finish reading. I’ll return to it one of these days on the strength of passages like this.

• 2022 in books, January 2, 2023—My favorite reads of last year. These posts usually don’t get sustained traffic but people keep coming back to this one. I hope they read at least some of what I recommend, because last year was a very good reading year for me.

• All Quiet on the Western Front, March 19, 2023—My ambivalent but mostly negative review of the new German-language film adaptation of Remarque’s novel. Short version: a technically magnificent bad adaptation.

• My problems with Glass Onion, February 10, 2023—Another film post, of which I’ve written more this year, this time sorting through some things that hung on and bothered me in the otherwise entertaining Rian Johnson whodunnit Glass Onion, which Sarah and I saw last fall.

• On ancient and medieval “propaganda,” January 16, 2023—Another post parsing a controversial term, this one a term that seems to me to have a purely modern and political valence that is distorting and anachronistic when applied to the past. I picked apart several examples that have been bugging me for years. I still see and hear people do this, so the struggle isn’t over yet.

Conclusion

As always, I appreciate y’all’s readership. This little bit of practice, this commonplace book, has been a fun and rewarding outlet, and the fact that people read and enjoy it still humbles me. It’s been a busy month, but I’ve got more things line up to write about once I can scrape together the time. It means a lot that y’all will be here for it. Thanks again! Here’s to 500 more posts!

Napoleon Bonaparte, teenage blogger

Yesterday I shared a post about Andrew Roberts’s Napoleon: A Life on Instagram. Coincidentally, when looking back at Goodreads to see how long it took me to read it, I discovered that I finished it eight years ago today, which I’m taking as an excuse to share a line that has amused me ever since.

Writing of the young Corsican’s submission for a French literary prize, Roberts relates:

Napoleon would later claim that he had withdrawn the essay before it was judged, but that is not in fact true. The Academy’s examiners gave it low marks for its excessively inflated style. One judge described it as ‘of too little interest, too ill-ordered, too disparate, too rambling, and too badly written to hold the reader’s attention’. Years later, Talleyrand obtained the original from the Academy’s archives and presented it to Napoleon.

Napoleon’s reaction speaks for all of us who started a blog during college:

“I found its author deserved to be whipped. What ridiculous things I said, and how annoyed I would be if they were preserved!”

One sympathizes.

Napoleon then—like anyone who has at some point deleted some ancient, teenage musings—burned the essay, “push[ing] it down with the tongs” to make sure it was good and gone. After all, “It might have exposed me to ridicule.”

That's not how any of this works

Director Ridley Scott talks with Dan Snow about Scott’s forthcoming film Napoleon

Yesterday History Hit released a 16-minute talk with Ridley Scott covering some aspects of his epic drama Napoleon, which comes out in three weeks. The interview is mostly interesting even if host Dan Snow doesn’t dig very deep, but Scott got strangely testy when Snow—over a clip of cannonballs smashing up the ice of a frozen pond beneath the feet of retreating Russian infantry at Austerlitz—raised the question of historical accuracy:

Snow: What about historical accuracy? When a historian says, “Uh, sorry, Sir Ridley, it didn’t quite happen like that,” you say, “Listen, I’ve done enough with you.” You have to have artistic license, right?

Scott: You know, I would say, “How would you know? Were you there?”

Snow: [laughs]

Scott: They go, “Oh, no, right.” I say, “Exactly.” So I said, You know, Napoleon [?] had four-hundred books written about him. So it means, maybe the first was the most accurate. The next one is already doing a version of the writer. By the time you get to 399, guess what—a lot of speculation.

Oof. That’s not how this works. That’s not how any of this works.

Historians don’t know things because they were there, they know things because they study. It’s work. They’ve read and researched and compared notes and argued and walked the ground. Scott’s rejoinder is surprisingly childish for such a sharp and accomplished man.

Further, his breezy explanation of how history works as a discipline and a profession is simply bizarre. The implication of what he says about how books cover a subject over time is that historical facts are established at the beginning, and the rest is just eggheads batting ever more intricate theoretical interpretations back and forth.

The truth is that, as I’ve had cause to reflect here recently, the first accounts of an event are fragmentary or partial even if they’re accurate. It takes diligent study, the perspective of time, the synthesis of all available sources, and a good bit of luck to piece together a big-picture account of what actually happened. And with big, heavily-documented subjects—like, say, a French emperor—new material is being discovered all the time. There is no substitute for a primary source or eyewitness account, but if you want accuracy qua accuracy, you will absolutely want a secondary source, a book written later.

I’m all for allowing responsible artistic license—I’m always interested to hear filmmakers explain how and why they choose to change what they change—but Scott doesn’t stop at artistic license. His arrogant dismissiveness toward truth in historical storytelling is breathtaking. Maybe he picked up more from Napoleon than he’s aware.

To be fair, Scott was speaking off-the-cuff, and is 85 years old. I’m not even absolutely certain he said “Napoleon” when he cited the figure of 400 books because he was mumbling. (The real figure, if he was talking about Napoleon, is tens of thousands, more than 300,000 by one old estimate.) But given his track record with using history for his own purposes—I stand by my thoughts on Kingdom of Heaven from the early days of this blog—and the forcefulness with which he said this, I have to assume he means it. I can’t say I’m surprised.

At any rate, I’m cautiously optimistic about Napoleon, but I’m not hoping for much more than interesting performances and exciting spectacle.

Literary cameos

Yesterday Alan Jacobs posted a longish recommendation of Francis Spufford’s latest novel, an alternate history detective noir titled Cahokia Jazz. I’m intrigued. But I especially enjoyed this minor note from the end of Jacobs’s post:

At one point, late in the story, our hero is at Cahokia’s railway station and happens to see a family, “pale, shabby-grand, and relocating with their life’s possessions”—including, curiously enough, butterfly nets: “white Russians on their way to Kodiak, by the look of it.” One of them, “a lanky twenty-something in flannels and tennis shoes,” is called by his family Vovka, and he briefly assists our hero. Then off they go, leaving our story as abruptly as they had arrived in it. Assuming that they made their way to Kodiak—or, more formally, as our map tells us, NOVAYA SIBIRSKAYA TERRITORII—it is unlikely that their world ever knew Lolita or Pale Fire.

This is “one of several delightful cameos” in the novel, and Jacobs’s recommendation and praise got me thinking about such cameos in fiction.

I haven’t read Cahokia Jazz yet, though I intend to, but I’m willing to take Jacobs at his word that Spufford does this well. The example he cites certainly sounds subtle enough to work. But done poorly, such cameos awkwardly shoehorn a well-known figure into the story and call unnecessary attention to themselves. Think Forrest Gump in novel form. They can also, if used to denigrate the characters in the story, turn into the kind of wink-wink presentist authorial irony that I deplore.

I think the best version of the literary cameo functions much like a good film cameo—if you spot the cameo and know who it is, it’s a nice bonus, but if you don’t it doesn’t intrude enough to distract. And, ideally, it will work with and add to the story and characterization of the main characters.

A good and especially subtle example comes from Declare, which I’m almost finished reading. Early in the novel we read of protagonist Andrew Hale’s background, specifically where he was in the early stages of World War II before embarking on his first espionage assignments in occupied France:

In November he successfully sat for an exhibition scholarship to Magdalen College, Oxford, and in the spring of 1941 he went up to that college to read English literature.

His allowance from Drummond’s Bank in Admiralty Arch was not big enough for him to do any of the high living for which Oxford was legendary, but wartime rationing appeared to have cut down on that kind of thing in any case—even cigarettes and beer were too costly for most of the students in Hale’s college, and it was fortunate that the one-way lanes of Oxford were too narrow for comfortable driving and parking, since bicycles were the only vehicles most students could afford to maintain. His time was spent mostly in the Bodleian Library researching Spenser and Malory, and defending his resultant essays in weekly sessions with his merciless tutor.

A Magdalen College tutor ruthlessly grilling a student over Spenser and Malory? That can only be CS Lewis.

They’re not precisely cameos, but I have worked a few real-life figures into my novels in greater or lesser supporting roles: David Howarth in Dark Full of Enemies, Gustavus W Smith and Pleasant Philips in Griswoldville. I’ve aimed a little lower in the name of realism, I suppose. But the precise dividing line between a cameo of the kind described here and a real person playing a serious role in a story is something I’ll have to figure out.

At any rate, a well-executed literary cameo is a joy. Curious to see who else might surprise us in the pages of Cahokia Jazz.

The King's Choice

King Haakon VII (Jesper Christensen) and the Norwegian government meet while on the run in The King’s Choice

A few weekends ago I coincidentally watched two movies about kings and resolved to review both of them. The first was The Lost King, the story of how Richard III’s grave was found. Here, after a regrettable delay, is the second—The King’s Choice.

The Second World War in Europe began with Germany’s invasion of Poland in September 1939, but after this initial blaze of violence the war—at least from the Western perspective—settled into months and months of inactive “phoney war.” Britain and France were technically at war with Germany but there was little shooting. That changed dramatically in the spring of 1940.

After protracted diplomatic wangling, Germany invaded both Denmark and Norway on April 9. Infantry and armor attacks as well as history’s first paratrooper assaults overwhelmed the Danish border, and King Christian X chose to capitulate the same morning. But across the Skagerakk, the strait separating Denmark and Norway, his younger brother King Haakon VII reacted differently.

The King’s Choice (Kongens nei) tells Haakon’s story. Opening on the day before the invasion, when word of the sinking of a German ship in Norwegian waters arrives in Oslo, the film follows Haakon (Jesper Christensen) and Olav (Anders Baasmo Christiansen), his son and heir, and the German ambassador Curt Bräuer (Karl Markovics) as Germany launches its invasion and Norway scrambles to respond. Haakon faces difficult choices: Escape to Britain? Evacuate his family but remain behind himself, like his brother in Denmark, and face occupation? Capitulate, and head a German puppet government under the loathsome Vidkun Quisling? Haakon determines early on to resist, but faced with the overwhelming might of the German war machine, how much resistance is appropriate, for how long, and to what end? Simultaneously, Olav struggles to reconcile his duty as the Crown Prince with his strained devotion to his father. Both are burdened with choosing what is best for Norway.

Bräuer’s parallel struggle is especially interesting. An awkward choice as a diplomat, Bräuer speaks little Norwegian but admires Norway and its people and sincerely desires peace. He also believes, naively, that the conflict brewing up between Nazi Germany and Norway can be resolved by men of goodwill, and that if he can present moderate terms to Haakon personally, before it is too late, the war can be halted if not prevented. Where Haakon and Olav’s story is one of finding strength to face an enemy, Bräuer’s, tragically, is one of disillusion.

The film nicely balances these character studies with the events of the opening days of the invasion. As Bräuer’s diplomatic woes play out in the background, Haakon, Olav, the royal family, and the Norwegian parliament flee Oslo. They fall back repeatedly, working their way farther north and ever closer to the Swedish border with the Germans only a few hours behind them. Escape and exile beckon, and death is a constant danger. At one point, Haakon, Olav, and their families narrowly escape German bombing, and at another, only the dedication and bravery of the young reservists manning a roadblock hold back a German paratrooper assault as the royals and government escape to their next hiding place.

These sequences—and a truly brilliant early action scene depicting the defense of Oslofjord and the sinking of the German cruiser Blücher, which looms out of the nighttime murk like some primeval monster—are the only combat in the film. The King’s Choice is a film of hastily called nighttime conferences, ad hoc meetings, and breathless situation reports. But the filmmakers use the sparse action judiciously, punctuating the movements of Haakon, deepening the crisis surrounding Bräuer, and raising the stakes for both—and for the people of Norway. By the time Bräuer finally receives his audience with the king, the potential consequences of the king’s choice are abundantly clear.

It further helps that the central performances are so good. Jesper Christensen will probably be most familiar to viewers in the Anglosphere as Mr White of the Daniel Craig Bond films. He plays Haakon as a strong, principled man keenly aware of his own vulnerability and the longterm ramifications of his choices. His duties toward the people weigh on him—especially since, unlike his older brother, he was not born to the throne but chosen by the people—and as he nears seventy years old he struggles manfully to withstand the bodily pains worsened by the political pressures placed upon him. Repeated scenes in which he tries to stretch and ease his bad back provide a perfectly understated human note.

Markovics (who played the lead in The Counterfeiters, a powerful German film you should watch if you haven’t) offers an excellent counterpart as Bräuer, a principled man who is nonetheless deeply deceived about his position and the forces at play in the conflict. And Christiansen as Crown Prince Olav, who feels pulled in multiple directions by his loyalty to his father, his love of his family, and his duty to the people of Norway, brings both tension and respect to his relationship with Haakon, with past hurts and family troubles only further complicating the king’s position during the invasion.

I was only passingly familiar with the role played by Haakon and the Norwegian government in 1940, so I can’t say whether the film’s interpersonal dramas are accurate or even fair. I will note that both Haakon and Olav, regardless of their differences, real or imagined, are presented respectfully. But like a comparable British film, Darkest Hour, such drama heightens the action and offers a way for the viewer to grasp the personal and emotional stakes of the geopolitical maneuvering. I certainly intend to study Haakon and his family in more detail in the future.

The King’s Choice is a finely dramatized sliver of World War II history, one very often overlooked in the American memory of the war. Like all the best films about the war, it brings the viewer into the uncertainty of the moment and underscores the principled courage of leaders who withstood aggression and guided their people through the darkness. It is well worth seeking out.

More if you’re interested

Two other Norwegian war films that I’ve seen in recent years are Max Manus: Man of War and The 12th Man, both of which concern the Norwegian resistance. I reviewed each briefly on the blog here and here. Haakon briefly appears in the former. And as a good companion film to The King’s Choice I’d recommend 9. April, a Danish movie that follows a company of bicycle infantry from the last midnight hours before the German invasion to the King of Denmark’s capitulation later that day. I gave it a full review here and it is available in its entirety, at least for now, on YouTube here.

The Civil War as “psychological test”

An interesting perspective from across the Atlantic in military historian Charles Townshend’s introductory chapter in the updated 2005 edition of The Oxford History of Modern War:

Had Europeans been able to recognize it, a still more sobering vision of the future had been provided by the American Civil War. Moltke himself dismissed the American armies—nearly half a million men on the Confederate side, over twice that number raised by the Union—as mere mobs chasing each other about the countryside. Certainly they were quite unlike European armies, more mercurial in temper and unreliable in discipline. But the failure to meet Abraham Lincoln’s unambiguous demand to ‘destroy the rebel army’ was not simply due to lack of military efficiency. Admittedly, Union generals before Ulysses S. Grant often lacked his confidence and energy. His epigrammatic assertion that ‘the art of war is simple enough; find out where your enemy is, get at him as soon as you can, strike at him as hard as you can, and keep moving on’ was suitably Clausewitzian; but even he could not easily overwhelm entrenchments of the kind dug by the Confederate defenders of Petersburg in 1864. The fruitless pursuit of decisive military victories was eventually replaced by a policy of devastation, targeting the civilian roots of Confederate strength. General Philip Sheridan's systematic devastation of the Shenandoah Valley in the autumn of 1864 was paralleled by William T. Sherman’s frankly terrorist six-month ‘march to the sea’ across the heartland of the Confederacy.

The American Civil War was a war of attrition, won by the slow mobilization of the industrial and technical superiority of the Northern states.* But it was not primarily a technological struggle. The Confederacy could only succeed by making the cost of the war too great: ultimately, the war was a psychological test. On the Union side, the challenge produced a response which was, in Clausewitzian terms, absolute. But while the Confederate President Jefferson Davis declared ‘we are fighting for existence’, the South proved ultimately unable to draw on the resources of modern national solidarity. The war thus confirmed the European model: national will was the basis of military force.

I appreciate the cultural and political emphasis here rather than the easy but incomplete technological or material explanation. Why the Confederacy was thus “unable to draw on the resources of modern national solidarity” is covered well in books like Emory Thomas’s The Confederate Nation and, in a much more specific study of how this affected a specific army, Larry Daniel’s Conquered: Why the Army of Tennessee Failed.

Viewing the Civil War alongside the simultaneous wars of Italian and German national unification, in which strong states (Piedmont-Sardinia, Prussia) invoked artificial national identities to enforce union and conformity, with long-running culture wars to follow, really helps make sense of what was happening on our side of the Atlantic at the time. Certainly, when teaching Western Civ II, when I invoke the Civil War after having taught the unification of Italy and Germany, I can see the relationship click for students. Conscription, propaganda, constitutional flexibility, and the state suppression or demonization of anti-war or pacifist elements are other familiar aspects of nationalist wars that relied (and rely) on the psychology of mass politics for victory.

Of course, Townshend’s invocation of attrition in the grinding bloodbath of the Civil War subtly underscores the psychological or “national will” factor. Since I’ve mentioned him here several times lately anyway, here’s John Keegan in Intelligence in War—which, coincidentally, includes a long chapter on Stonewall Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley campaign:

War is ultimately about doing, not thinking. . . . War is not an intellectual activity but a brutally physical one. War always tends towards attrition, which is a competition in inflicting and bearing bloodshed, and the nearer attrition approaches to the extreme, the less thought counts.

Severe attrition in ancient and medieval armies usually resulted in one side breaking after a few hours at most, but modern armies—the mass conscripted armies of “people’s wars,” the subject of other chapters in The Oxford History of Modern War—endure it for days, weeks, months, with far worse results than in ancient and medieval wars. Here, as Townshend suggests, the Civil War is a prototype.

* Protip: Avoid mentioning this aspect of the outcome of the war online; though manifestly true, it will summon someone with a Sherman profile pic to come and call you a “Lost Causer.”

The fog of war is no excuse

Speaking of John Keegan, here’s a passage from the chapter on Waterloo from The Face of Battle that I’d like to enlarge upon. Regarding the way the Battle of Waterloo is traditionally described as unfolding—in five “phases” of engagement—Keegan writes:

It is probably otiose to point out that the ‘five phases’ of the battle were not perceived at the time by any of the combatants, not even, despite their points of vantage and powers of direct intervention in events, by Wellington and Napoleon. The ‘five phases’ are, of course, a narrative convenience.

A narrative convenience, he might have added, laboriously gathered and constructed after the fact and over many years. He goes on to describe “how very partial indeed was the view of most of” the participants, beginning with distraction and proceeding to visibility:

There were other causes, besides the preoccupation of duty, which deprived men of a coherent or extended view of what was going on around them. Many regiments spent much of their time lying down, usually on the reverse slope of the position, which itself obscured sight of the action elsewhere. . . . A few feet of elevation, therefore, made the difference between a bird’s-eye and a worm’s-eye view . . . But even on the crest of a position, physical obstacles could limit the soldier’s horizon very sharply. In many places, at least at the beginning of the battle, the crops of wheat and rye stood tall enough for the enemy to approach to within close musket shot undetected. . . . [T]he men in the rear or interior of dense columnar formations, of the type adopted by the Guard in their advance, would have glimpsed little of the battle but hats, necks and backs, and those at a distance of a few inches, even when their comrades at the front were exchanging fire with the enemy. And almost everyone, however well-positioned otherwise for a view, would for shorter or longer periods have been lapped or enveloped by dense clouds of gunpowder smoke.

And those are just problems affecting vision. The other senses have equally severe limitations and are just as susceptible to illusion. Look up acoustic shadow sometime. Keegan: “To have asked a survivor . . . what he remembered of the battle, therefore, would probably not have been to learn very much.”

Now compound these limitations and frequent misperceptions and misunderstands by passing them through reporters. But at least reporters are impartial, right?

Visit the New York Times complete online digital archive—or the archive of any old newspaper—and look up a the earliest possible reporting on a conflict you know a lot about. You’ll be amazed at how much is simply wrong. And that’s not even allowing for spin, for bias, for lies, for manifold other motivated errors.

What we know about battles and wars and other conflicts we know because of that laborious process I mentioned above, of gathering, compiling, organizing, and collating sources and information, and then study and study and more study, not to mention walking the ground. There are things happening now that we will never—none of us in our own lifetimes—have the perspective, much less the information, to understand completely. Even then, there will still be unanswered questions, or questions answered after years, even centuries of uncertainty.

“Assume that everything you hear or read about a current conflict is wrong, incomplete, made up, or the precise opposite of the truth.”

So my rule of thumb: Assume that everything you hear or read about a current conflict is wrong, incomplete, made up, or the precise opposite of the truth. And wait. And don’t get emotionally invested in what’s happening, especially if your sense of moral worth depends upon viewing yourself as on The Right Side and raging against a barbarous enemy.

War is tragic, and people will suffer. That’s guaranteed. But there is no reason to compound those facts with ignorant and impotent rage.

If you slow down, you won’t beclown yourself the way certain institutions have in the previous week. Many of these have now, suddenly, discovered the concept of “fog of war,” which has been dusted off to provide a sage reminder to readers instead of a mea culpa. Look here and here for samples, and here for well-earned mockery.

Per Alan Jacobs, who wrote excellently and succinctly on this topic over the weekend:

The more unstable a situation is, the more rapidly it changes, the less valuable minute-by-minute reporting is. I don’t know what happened to the hospital in Gaza, but if I wait until the next issue of the Economist shows up I will be better informed about it than people who have been rage-refreshing their browser windows for the past several days, and I will have suffered considerably less emotional stress. . . .

“We have a responsibility to be informed!” people shout. Well, maybe . . . But let me waive the point, and say: If you’re reading the news several times a day, you’re not being informed, you’re being stimulated.

To the New York Times’s credit, it has offered an editorial apology, but, as Jeff Winger once put it, “Be sorry about this stuff before you do it, and then don’t do it!”

I’ll end with a reflection from CS Lewis, in a passage from his World War II radio talks eventually incorporated into Mere Christianity, a passage that was going the rounds late last week:

Suppose one reads a story of filthy atrocities in the paper. Then suppose that something turns up suggesting that the story might not be quite true, or not quite so bad as it was made out. Is one's first feeling, ‘Thank God, even they aren't quite so bad as that,’ or is it a feeling of disappointment, and even a determination to cling to the first story for the sheer pleasure of thinking your enemies are as bad as possible? If it is the second then it is, I am afraid, the first step in a process which, if followed to the end, will make us into devils. You see, one is beginning to wish that black was a little blacker. If we give that wish its head, later on we shall wish to see grey as black, and then to see white itself as black. Finally we shall insist on seeing everything . . . as bad, and not be able to stop doing it: we shall be fixed for ever in a universe of pure hatred.

Let the reader understand.

We already have something approaching Screwtape’s universe of pure noise. Can we still turn back from a universe of pure hatred?