Maturity and evolution in military history

A friend with a deep interest in Celtic and specifically Welsh history recently shared this passage from a popular book on ancient Celtic warfare, in which the author tries to see through legendary material relating to Irish warbands:

If the Fianna of the Irish epics are actually celebrated in epic verse as a heroic archetype, an in-depth and disillusioned examination can recognize their historical characters as unruly elements and promoters of endemic political unrest, taking part in conflict only for the sake of conflict and, due to the absence of alternative adversaries, maintaining an obsolete, un-evolving developmental phase of warfare.

Elsewhere in the same book the author describes Celtic warfare in the British Isles as not “mature” compared to the warfare of their Continental cousins. My friend was puzzled by this passage (and wryly noted that it “sounds like it was written by a Roman colonial governor”) and its suggestion that geographic isolation left British Celtic warfare moribund and pointless.

That language of maturity and evolution and development—even the simple noun phase—is a giveaway. There is a whiggish approach to military history that views warfare as progressing linearly, from the primitive, ritualized fighting of the tribe to the pragmatic modern professional army in the employ of a nation-state pursuing rational material objectives. As Jeremy Black puts it in his introduction to The Age of Total War: 1860-1945, which I serendipitously picked up just after seeing my friend’s posts on this topic, this “teleological” approach describes history as “mov[ing] in a clear direction, with developments from one period to another, and particular characteristics in each. This approach is an aspect of modernization theory.”

I’ve written on this topic before, and with reference to another book by Black, coincidentally, but what I didn’t get into as much in that post was the dangers of this view of linear historical progress.

There are two big problems with this approach. The first is that it encourages an assessment of historical subjects as good or bad, better or worse, primitive or modern, depending on how closely they approximate what a modern person recognizes as warfare. A culture’s warfare, in this view, is “mature” insofar as it resembles us, the implicitly assumed endpoint. Judgments according to modern standards are sure to follow.* The condemnation of “endemic political unrest” gives away the author’s assumption that “rest,” so to speak, is the norm. Ancient people didn’t see it that way.

The second, related problem is that, with this viewpoint in place, you need not actually understand a given culture and why it would fight the way it did on its own terms. You can simply slot it into place in a linear scheme of technical and/or tactical evolution and ignore their own viewpoint on the subject.

The result, which has been pointed out as far back as Herbert Butterfield’s Whig Interpretation of History, is that you train yourself either to dismiss or simply not to see anything falling outside the thread of development you’ve chosen to follow and you blind yourself to what’s actually going on with that culture. The search for through lines and resemblances warps the overall view. This is, at base, a form of presentism.

There’s quite a lot of this in the older historiography of Anglo-Saxon warfare. Like the ancient Britons and Irish, the Anglo-Saxons were geographically isolated from related cultures like the Franks for centuries following the Migration Period and continued to fight in recognizably older ways than their cousins. So a common whiggish approach to the story of the Conquest was that the outdated (notice the use of obsolete in the quotation we started with) infantry levy of Harold Godwinson was quite naturally defeated by the combined arms of the Normans, who deployed infantry, cavalry, and dedicated archers at Hastings. It’s a step in evolution, you see, the end of a “phase.” It’s easy to detect a faint tone of contempt for the Anglo-Saxons in a lot of those old books.

This is, of course, to ignore the entire history of this culture, its past enemies and conflicts,** and the good reasons they had to develop and use the military institutions and methods that they did. And so a historian can blithely describe a culture’s unique response to the situations it had found itself in as simply stuck in a rut—until the inevitable triumph of something more modern. No further investigation needed.

Not only is this approach presentist, it fosters an incuriosity that is the bane of good history.

* And the modern always gets the benefit of the doubt, which is morally questionable. Tribal warriors fighting for prestige on behalf of their king is “primitive” and bad but a state nuking civilians in the name of democracy is “modern” and therefore good.

** As well as the fact that William the Conqueror’s victory was down more to luck than to battlefield performance.

On the term “assault rifle”

German troops in the Battle of the Bulge carrying (inset) The Sturmgewehr-44, the original assault rifle

Years ago* I wrote an Amazon review for a book on the militarization of American police forces, and among the biggest surprises that came my way when lots of people chose to comment on that review was the accusation that I was “liberal” or otherwise anti-gun because, in the course of describing the military equipment increasingly adopted by even small local police forces, I had used the term assault rifle.

This struck me as an odd reaction. Assault rifle, I thought, may be an awkward politics-adjacent term with probably too-broad connotations but it still denotes a specific thing as precisely as possible. I found it entirely appropriate to use, not least since the author of the book I was reviewing used it, but I still found myself avoiding it over the next few years. Eventually, I became annoyed enough by online arguments about guns—all of which, on both sides, shared a highly emotive imprecision in how they talked about the subject—that I started a blog post with the same title as this one, only to abandon it in incomplete draft form a year or two ago. Why bother?

Well, over the weekend Ian McCollum of Forgotten Weapons** posted an excellent “mild rant” on precisely this topic: “What is an ‘assault rifle?’” Like me, he was surprised to find himself getting flamed for using the term; like me, he discerned that this had a lot to do with political rather than technical, definitional factors; but unlike me, he took a firm line and expressed it well.

McCollum starts with an assault rifle’s three basic characteristics:

• It has select-fire capability, i.e., it can fire in more than one mode, e.g. fully automatic, semi-automatic, and/or burst

• It feeds ammunition from detachable magazines, as opposed to a belt or internal magazine

• It fires an intermediate rifle cartridge, i.e. a cartridge larger than a pistol cartridge but smaller than full-sized rifle cartridges

This is succinct and technically precise. Stray from these parameters, he notes, and what you have is not an assault rifle. Civilian AR-15s, for instance, that fire an intermediate rifle cartridge and use detachable magazines but can only fire in semi-automatic are not assault rifles—they are simply semi-automatic rifles. An automatic weapon fed from a belt is not an assault rifle, but a machine gun—even if it fires an intermediate cartridge, like the M249 SAW.

Because that third factor—the intermediate cartridge—is decisive. For example, a select-fire weapon with detachable magazines that fires a full-sized rifle cartridge is a light machine gun (like the BAR or Bren); a select-fire weapon with detachable magazines that fires pistol cartridges is a submachine gun (like the Thompson, the MP40, or the UMP). In fact, the term submachine gun was coined to distinguish the smaller, one-man “trench brooms” developed near the end of and immediately following the First World War from the big crew-served belt-fed machine guns—the Maxim, the Vickers, the Spandau—that had already become horribly familiar. Take a look at when the term submachine gun originates and becomes more common. Firearms terminology can be messy, but as in so many other things, a little understanding of history helps.

This is especially true of the term assault rifle. As McCollum points out, assault rifle is a translation of the German Sturmgewehr, a term coined—according to some stories by Hitler himself—to distinguish a newly developed service rifle from its predecessors. The rifle was the Sturmgewehr-44 or StG-44. It was select-fire, fed from a detachable magazine, and it fired an intermediate cartridge, a shortened version of the 7.92mm Mauser rifle round. This proved its key innovation, both for practical reasons (modern infantry combat typically occurs within a few hundred yards, making a rifle that can hit a target 2,000 yards away a waste for all but snipers) and economic ones (reducing the amount of raw materials per round, giving Hitler’s war machine literally more bang for its buck).

Whoever coined the term, it was a helpful designation for a new thing—no previous weapon did precisely what the StG-44 did in the way the StG-44 was designed to do it, and it set the standard for a whole new variety of firearms. Whatever their design, military rifles ever since have been defined according to the StG-44’s characteristics.

And yet there’s that pesky Sturm.***

The word had appealing propaganda value to the Germans and retains it in English, assault being “scary military language” to a large class of politically active people. This has laden a useful and specific term with political connotations. As McCollum notes, assault rifle is often mentally bundled up with assault weapon, virtually meaningless verbiage used for legislation intended to create a “blanket prohibition on firearms that had a military appearance” (emphasis mine), usually related to accessories that don’t materially alter the lethality of the weapons in question.

The result is two political camps: one that, operating either in ignorance or bad faith, makes sweeping statements about vaguely defined “assault weapons” in pursuit of even more sweeping legislation, and another camp that has reacted to this rhetoric by avoiding the term assault rifle in the belief that it using it gives aid and comfort to the enemy. As McCollum puts it, they think calling an assault rifle an assault rifle is “surrendering to the people who want to ban guns.”

But the opposite is actually true. McCollum:

We should use the term assault rifle in its technically proper context because to do otherwise would be to essentially surrender the use of language to people who are deliberately misusing it in an attempt to pass legislative agendas.

McCollum is right. If our language is to have any set meaning, it depends on knowledgeable people of good faith to insist on precise definitions and careful usage. Changing our vocabulary to avoid words tainted by political debate is to play an Orwellian game that those of good faith can’t win. And, as should be clear anywhere you care to look, there is far more at stake in this than a single firearms term of art.

More if you’re interested

CJ Chivers’s The Gun is a deeply researched and authoritative history of automatic weapons from the Gatling gun through the first truly automatic weapon, the Maxim gun, through the submachine gun and light machine gun eras until settling into the dueling developments of the AK-47 and AR-15/M-16. Along the way he gives brief space to the StG-44 and notes its crucial role in the rise of the assault rifle. I highly recommend it.

Speaking of the StG-44, Forgotten Weapons has done several great videos on the rifle over the years. You can check out two good ones, including a range demonstration, here and here, and a comparison with a more famous early assault rifle, the AK-47, here.

Notes

* By a weird coincidence, I posted that review ten years ago today.

** I think I discovered Forgotten Weapons while researching the Griswold and Gunnison revolver for Griswoldville. I had seen demonstrations of reproduction pistols but McCollum offered a solid history and technical breakdown that proved very helpful. You can watch that here. Subsequently, when casting about for names for minor characters in my most recent book, The Snipers, I settled on “McCollum” for a member of the team that makes the climactic assault.

*** Apparently some people want to translate Sturmgewehr using the most literal cognate available in English: storm. But as several native German speakers point out in the comments on McCollum’s video, assault is a standard, unremarkable, accurate translation for Sturm. The “storm” the German word is related to is not the kind predicted by the local weatherman, but the kind undertaken by medieval infantry scrambling up siege ladders or Washington’s Continental regulars at Yorktown—storming the ramparts. This obviously means “assault.”

The Civil War as “psychological test”

An interesting perspective from across the Atlantic in military historian Charles Townshend’s introductory chapter in the updated 2005 edition of The Oxford History of Modern War:

Had Europeans been able to recognize it, a still more sobering vision of the future had been provided by the American Civil War. Moltke himself dismissed the American armies—nearly half a million men on the Confederate side, over twice that number raised by the Union—as mere mobs chasing each other about the countryside. Certainly they were quite unlike European armies, more mercurial in temper and unreliable in discipline. But the failure to meet Abraham Lincoln’s unambiguous demand to ‘destroy the rebel army’ was not simply due to lack of military efficiency. Admittedly, Union generals before Ulysses S. Grant often lacked his confidence and energy. His epigrammatic assertion that ‘the art of war is simple enough; find out where your enemy is, get at him as soon as you can, strike at him as hard as you can, and keep moving on’ was suitably Clausewitzian; but even he could not easily overwhelm entrenchments of the kind dug by the Confederate defenders of Petersburg in 1864. The fruitless pursuit of decisive military victories was eventually replaced by a policy of devastation, targeting the civilian roots of Confederate strength. General Philip Sheridan's systematic devastation of the Shenandoah Valley in the autumn of 1864 was paralleled by William T. Sherman’s frankly terrorist six-month ‘march to the sea’ across the heartland of the Confederacy.

The American Civil War was a war of attrition, won by the slow mobilization of the industrial and technical superiority of the Northern states.* But it was not primarily a technological struggle. The Confederacy could only succeed by making the cost of the war too great: ultimately, the war was a psychological test. On the Union side, the challenge produced a response which was, in Clausewitzian terms, absolute. But while the Confederate President Jefferson Davis declared ‘we are fighting for existence’, the South proved ultimately unable to draw on the resources of modern national solidarity. The war thus confirmed the European model: national will was the basis of military force.

I appreciate the cultural and political emphasis here rather than the easy but incomplete technological or material explanation. Why the Confederacy was thus “unable to draw on the resources of modern national solidarity” is covered well in books like Emory Thomas’s The Confederate Nation and, in a much more specific study of how this affected a specific army, Larry Daniel’s Conquered: Why the Army of Tennessee Failed.

Viewing the Civil War alongside the simultaneous wars of Italian and German national unification, in which strong states (Piedmont-Sardinia, Prussia) invoked artificial national identities to enforce union and conformity, with long-running culture wars to follow, really helps make sense of what was happening on our side of the Atlantic at the time. Certainly, when teaching Western Civ II, when I invoke the Civil War after having taught the unification of Italy and Germany, I can see the relationship click for students. Conscription, propaganda, constitutional flexibility, and the state suppression or demonization of anti-war or pacifist elements are other familiar aspects of nationalist wars that relied (and rely) on the psychology of mass politics for victory.

Of course, Townshend’s invocation of attrition in the grinding bloodbath of the Civil War subtly underscores the psychological or “national will” factor. Since I’ve mentioned him here several times lately anyway, here’s John Keegan in Intelligence in War—which, coincidentally, includes a long chapter on Stonewall Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley campaign:

War is ultimately about doing, not thinking. . . . War is not an intellectual activity but a brutally physical one. War always tends towards attrition, which is a competition in inflicting and bearing bloodshed, and the nearer attrition approaches to the extreme, the less thought counts.

Severe attrition in ancient and medieval armies usually resulted in one side breaking after a few hours at most, but modern armies—the mass conscripted armies of “people’s wars,” the subject of other chapters in The Oxford History of Modern War—endure it for days, weeks, months, with far worse results than in ancient and medieval wars. Here, as Townshend suggests, the Civil War is a prototype.

* Protip: Avoid mentioning this aspect of the outcome of the war online; though manifestly true, it will summon someone with a Sherman profile pic to come and call you a “Lost Causer.”

The fog of war is no excuse

Speaking of John Keegan, here’s a passage from the chapter on Waterloo from The Face of Battle that I’d like to enlarge upon. Regarding the way the Battle of Waterloo is traditionally described as unfolding—in five “phases” of engagement—Keegan writes:

It is probably otiose to point out that the ‘five phases’ of the battle were not perceived at the time by any of the combatants, not even, despite their points of vantage and powers of direct intervention in events, by Wellington and Napoleon. The ‘five phases’ are, of course, a narrative convenience.

A narrative convenience, he might have added, laboriously gathered and constructed after the fact and over many years. He goes on to describe “how very partial indeed was the view of most of” the participants, beginning with distraction and proceeding to visibility:

There were other causes, besides the preoccupation of duty, which deprived men of a coherent or extended view of what was going on around them. Many regiments spent much of their time lying down, usually on the reverse slope of the position, which itself obscured sight of the action elsewhere. . . . A few feet of elevation, therefore, made the difference between a bird’s-eye and a worm’s-eye view . . . But even on the crest of a position, physical obstacles could limit the soldier’s horizon very sharply. In many places, at least at the beginning of the battle, the crops of wheat and rye stood tall enough for the enemy to approach to within close musket shot undetected. . . . [T]he men in the rear or interior of dense columnar formations, of the type adopted by the Guard in their advance, would have glimpsed little of the battle but hats, necks and backs, and those at a distance of a few inches, even when their comrades at the front were exchanging fire with the enemy. And almost everyone, however well-positioned otherwise for a view, would for shorter or longer periods have been lapped or enveloped by dense clouds of gunpowder smoke.

And those are just problems affecting vision. The other senses have equally severe limitations and are just as susceptible to illusion. Look up acoustic shadow sometime. Keegan: “To have asked a survivor . . . what he remembered of the battle, therefore, would probably not have been to learn very much.”

Now compound these limitations and frequent misperceptions and misunderstands by passing them through reporters. But at least reporters are impartial, right?

Visit the New York Times complete online digital archive—or the archive of any old newspaper—and look up a the earliest possible reporting on a conflict you know a lot about. You’ll be amazed at how much is simply wrong. And that’s not even allowing for spin, for bias, for lies, for manifold other motivated errors.

What we know about battles and wars and other conflicts we know because of that laborious process I mentioned above, of gathering, compiling, organizing, and collating sources and information, and then study and study and more study, not to mention walking the ground. There are things happening now that we will never—none of us in our own lifetimes—have the perspective, much less the information, to understand completely. Even then, there will still be unanswered questions, or questions answered after years, even centuries of uncertainty.

“Assume that everything you hear or read about a current conflict is wrong, incomplete, made up, or the precise opposite of the truth.”

So my rule of thumb: Assume that everything you hear or read about a current conflict is wrong, incomplete, made up, or the precise opposite of the truth. And wait. And don’t get emotionally invested in what’s happening, especially if your sense of moral worth depends upon viewing yourself as on The Right Side and raging against a barbarous enemy.

War is tragic, and people will suffer. That’s guaranteed. But there is no reason to compound those facts with ignorant and impotent rage.

If you slow down, you won’t beclown yourself the way certain institutions have in the previous week. Many of these have now, suddenly, discovered the concept of “fog of war,” which has been dusted off to provide a sage reminder to readers instead of a mea culpa. Look here and here for samples, and here for well-earned mockery.

Per Alan Jacobs, who wrote excellently and succinctly on this topic over the weekend:

The more unstable a situation is, the more rapidly it changes, the less valuable minute-by-minute reporting is. I don’t know what happened to the hospital in Gaza, but if I wait until the next issue of the Economist shows up I will be better informed about it than people who have been rage-refreshing their browser windows for the past several days, and I will have suffered considerably less emotional stress. . . .

“We have a responsibility to be informed!” people shout. Well, maybe . . . But let me waive the point, and say: If you’re reading the news several times a day, you’re not being informed, you’re being stimulated.

To the New York Times’s credit, it has offered an editorial apology, but, as Jeff Winger once put it, “Be sorry about this stuff before you do it, and then don’t do it!”

I’ll end with a reflection from CS Lewis, in a passage from his World War II radio talks eventually incorporated into Mere Christianity, a passage that was going the rounds late last week:

Suppose one reads a story of filthy atrocities in the paper. Then suppose that something turns up suggesting that the story might not be quite true, or not quite so bad as it was made out. Is one's first feeling, ‘Thank God, even they aren't quite so bad as that,’ or is it a feeling of disappointment, and even a determination to cling to the first story for the sheer pleasure of thinking your enemies are as bad as possible? If it is the second then it is, I am afraid, the first step in a process which, if followed to the end, will make us into devils. You see, one is beginning to wish that black was a little blacker. If we give that wish its head, later on we shall wish to see grey as black, and then to see white itself as black. Finally we shall insist on seeing everything . . . as bad, and not be able to stop doing it: we shall be fixed for ever in a universe of pure hatred.

Let the reader understand.

We already have something approaching Screwtape’s universe of pure noise. Can we still turn back from a universe of pure hatred?

Making faces at the world

One of the books that most shaped me when I was figuring out how and why I studied history was The Face of Battle, by John Keegan. I read it in grad school at Clemson and ended up writing my own master’s thesis as a similar series of experience-focused case studies. This week I revisited it via the audiobook, which I listened to on my commute. It was great to go back to it after fifteen years of further study and growth, to see familiar passages afresh and to rediscover many, many details I had simply forgotten.

Like this, from Keegan’s chapter on Waterloo:

What else are we to make of the experience of the 40th Regiment? They had arrived at Waterloo dead tired after a march of fifty-one miles in forty-eight hours; three weeks before that they had disembarked from America, having been six weeks at sea. During the day of Waterloo, they lost nearly two hundred soldiers dead and wounded out of seven hundred, and fourteen out of thirty-nine officers. ‘The men in their tired state,’ Sergeant Lawrence wrote, began to despair during the afternoon, ‘but the officer cheered them on continuously.’ When the French cavalry encircled them ‘with fierce gesticulation and angry scowls, in which a display of incisors became very apparent’ the officers would call out, “Now men, make faces!’

“Make faces!” is precisely the kind of real-world absurdity in the face of death that can’t be invented. Not without effort, anyway. In all of my war fiction I’ve tried to include surprising or absurd notes—but only because I’ve read of so many like this.

Oddly—but in the free-association spirit of this blog—that moment from Waterloo brought to mind a favorite passage from CS Lewis. In a letter to his friend and fellow Inkling Owen Barfield, Lewis contrasted a certain materialist vision of the world with what living in it is actually like:

“Say what you like . . . the world is sillier and better fun than they make out.”

— CS Lewis

Talking of beasts and birds, have you ever noticed this contrast: that when you read a scientific account of any animal’s life you get an impression of laborious, incessant, almost rational economic activity (as if all animals were Germans), but when you study any animal you know, what at once strikes you is their cheerful fatuity, the pointlessness of nearly all they do. Say what you like, Barfield, the world is sillier and better fun than they make out.

Indeed, and even in the dark and grim moments. Perhaps especially then.

The Twilight World

Filmmaker Werner Herzog and Japanese soldier HIroo Onoda (1922-2014) upon his surrender in 1974

Werner Herzog is a filmmaker famously drawn to the obsessive, the fanatical, and the single-mindedly self-destructive. He also, based on my limited engagement with his filmography, appreciates grim irony but can tell ironic stories with great sympathy. So the story of Hiroo Onoda—a man we’ve all heard of even if you don’t know his name—is a natural fit for Herzog’s fascinations as well as his set of storytelling skills.

Onoda, a junior officer in the Imperial Japanese Army stationed on Lubang, a small island in the Philippines near the mouth of Manila Bay, took to the jungles after the American invasion began in late 1944. He had been specially detailed for acts of scorched earth sabotage—dynamiting a pier, rendering an airfield useless—and, having completed those objectives, to carry on the struggle against the enemy using “guerrilla tactics.” He had three other soldiers under his command. One turned himself in to Filipino forces in 1950, five years after the end of the war. The other two were killed, one in the mid-1950s and the other in 1972. Onoda held out alone until 1974, the next to last Japanese soldier to surrender.

Herzog met Onoda during a trip to Japan in 1997. This novel, The Twilight World, published in 2021, seven years after Onoda’s death at the age of 91, is the result of that meeting and Herzog’s enduring fascination.

Herzog explains, by way of prologue, the embarrassing circumstances that led to his meeting Onoda. He then begins Onoda’s story in 1974, with Norio Suzuki, a young adventurer whose stated goal was to find and see Hiroo Onoda, the yeti, and a giant panda, “in that order.” Suzuki camped out on Lubang until Onoda found him. Suzuki convinced Onoda to pose for a photograph and insisted that the war was over—long over. Onoda agreed to turn himself in if Suzuki could bring his commanding officer from thirty years before to Lubang and formally order him to stand down.

The novel then returns to the fall of 1944, the fateful days when a twenty-two-year old Onoda received his orders. Frustrated in his attempts to carry out his acts of sabotage, Onoda and his three subordinates move into the jungles and slowly figure out how to survive as guerrillas. They give up their tent, set up caches of ammunition, move repeatedly from place to place, crack coconuts, and attack isolated villages for food and supplies. Onoda broods. He lost his honor in failing to complete his objective, and the bravado of a final banzai charge would be absurd. What to do?

Herzog narrates this story dispassionately and without embellishment. His style is minimalistic but deeply absorbing. Michael Hofmann’s English translation reads like a cross between a screenplay—I wondered often while reading if this novel hadn’t begun life as a screenplay—and the stripped-down style of late Cormac McCarthy in No Country for Old Men and, especially, The Road. Herzog evokes mood and character through small, telling details and sharply observed environments.

This simple, direct approach proves richly rewarding. Most interesting to me were the ways in which Onoda and his comrades try to make sense of their own situation as the years pass. Evidence that the war is still going on are, from their perspective, plentiful and obvious. The Filipinos are still trying to kill them, aren’t they? And Onoda and his men regularly spot squadrons of American warplanes—ever larger and more sophisticated as the years pass, but still headed northwest toward mainland Asia. Herzog is here able to use the dangerous tool of dramatic irony for maximum pathos.

Most interesting, to me, were Onoda and company’s wrestling with repeated rumors that the war had ended. The American and Philippine militaries dropped leaflets explaining that the war was over. Onoda and his men interpreted mistakes in the leaflets’ Japanese typography as evidence that they were fake—a ruse. The Filipinos left a newspaper in a plastic bag at one of Onoda’s known resting points as proof that the war was long over. This, too, Onoda interpreted as a fabrication—what newspaper would ever print so many advertisements? Thus also with news heard on a transistor radio. Even when relatives of the holdouts travel to Lubang and call to them to come out over loudspeakers, Onoda finds reasons to believe they are being lied to. The Twilight World is, in this regard, one of the best and most involving portraits of the insane logic of paranoia that I’ve read.

But Herzog is, thematically, most interested in the passage of time. The scale of Onoda’s tenacity is almost unimaginable—twenty-nine years in the jungle. Twenty-nine years of surviving on stolen rice, of annual visits to Onoda’s hidden samurai sword to clean and oil it, of eluding Filipino police and soldiers, of watching American aircraft fly north, of attacking villages and avoiding ambush. What is that like?

In Herzog’s version of this story, after his initial commitment to his guerrilla campaign Onoda settles into a routine in which the years pass like minutes. In the jungles of Lubang Island, Onoda comes into some kind of contact with eternity. One is tempted to call this contact purgatorial, but Onoda is neither purged nor purified by his experience. Neither does this timelessness offer the beatific vision or even an experience of hell—if it had, Onoda might have surrendered in 1950 like his most weak-willed soldier. Instead, this eternity is an impersonal, indifferent one of duty lovelessly and unimaginatively fulfilled, forever.

I’ve seen The Twilight World accused of making a hero out of Onoda or of reinforcing a preexisting impression of Onoda as a heroic romantic holdout—an absurd accusation. As with many of Herzog’s other subjects, whether the self-deluded Timothy Treadwell or the innocent Zishe Breitbart, Herzog relates this story out of pure interest. Herzog, laudably, wants to understand. That he presents Onoda sympathetically does not mean that he condones his actions. If anything, the intensity with which Herzog tries to evoke Onoda’s three decades in the jungle is an invitation to pity and reflection. That’s certainly how I received it.

I’ve also read reviewers who fault Herzog for either downplaying or refusing to acknowledge Onoda’s violence against the Filipinos of Lubang Island. Onoda and his men’s depredations have quite justifiably received more attention in the last few years, notably in this spring’s MHQ cover story, rather provocatively if misleadingly titled “Hiroo Onoda: Soldier or Serial Killer?”

But Herzog does acknowledge this side of Onoda’s story. An early incident in which Onoda and his men attack villagers and kill and butcher one of their precious water buffalo is especially vivid. By the end, Onoda is walking into villages and firing randomly in the air, just to remind them he’s around. None of this is presented as heroic or even necessary. When Filipino troops try to ambush and kill Onoda and his men, the reader understands why.

Perhaps all of this is why Herzog begins his novel with a curious—but quintessentially Herzog-esque—author’s note:

Most details and factually correct; some are not. What was important to the author was something other than accuracy, some essence he thought he glimpsed when he encountered the protagonist of this story.

Seen in this light, and not forgetting that The Twilight World is a work of fiction—based on a true story—Hiroo Onoda’s bleak years in lonely touch with eternity are a fitting subject for a filmmaker who has spent his career teasing the mythic out of the real. The Twilight World is one of the most interesting and most involving books I’ve read this year, a testament not only to the strength of the dark and ironic story it tells but to the skill and cleareyed compassion of its storyteller.

Should trouble come

Ethiopian soldiers of the Imperial Army’s Kagnew Battalion in Korea, 1953

Watching the movie finally got me to read SLA Marshall’s Pork Chop Hill. Part II begins with a chapter on a patrol into a hazardous area of the front line known as the Alligator Jaws in the spring of 1953. The small patrol runs into a much larger Chinese force and fights them off from a ditch with a foot of water flowing through it.

But here’s a twist: this patrol is composed of Ethiopian troops sent to Korea by Emperor Haile Selassie. The troops acquit themselves well. One corporal’s arm is blown off at the shoulder by a Chinese grenade, and he calmly hands his weapon off to the man beside him and continues giving orders. This patrol’s performance is especially noteworthy since they are newly arrived in Korea and this is their first combat experience whatsoever.

Here’s how the action concludes as the Ethiopians withdraw to safety.

In that interval, [Lieutenant] Wongele Costa abandoned his position on the left side of the ditch. The casualties were carried to the position on the right flank. But in the darkness, he missed one man, not knowing that [Private Mano] Waldemarian was dead. So he called for lights again to assist the search. When the flare came on, he could see Waldemarian in the ditch. He sat there in a natural position, the rifle folded close in his arms. Wongele Costa crawled over to him, found that he was dead and so returned, carrying the body. Thereby he simply followed the tradition of his corps. Fiercely proud of the loyalty of their men, officers of the Imperial Guard are likely to say to a stranger, “Should trouble come, stay with me, I’ll be the last man to die.”

Chills.

Marshall goes on to note that among the Ethiopians, “in battle, it is the officer invariably who takes the extra risk to save one of his own.” He credits their success in withstanding Chinese attack to pre-patrol preparation, with the leaders carefully familiarizing themselves with their area of operations daily so that they knew their way even in the dark. And, in broken terrain, the Ethiopians would hold hands to avoid losing each other (by this point in the book Marshall has described American attacks falling apart this way at least ten times), a technique that “western troops would . . . scorn as beneath dignity.” The tradeoff, of course, is vulnerability to artillery and mortars, but on this patrol everything worked. Fitness for purpose.

The Ethiopian presence in Korea was a fascinating surprise to me, and I intend to learn more about it.

Pork Chop Hill

Gregory Peck as Lt Joe Clemons with Woody Strode and Norman Fell in Pork Chop Hill (1959)

Last week was my wife and children’s spring break, and while they spent a few days in Charleston I caught up on a backlog of war movies. The one I most looked forward to was 1959’s Pork Chop Hill. The Korean War is underrepresented in the war film canon and, owing largely to my granddad’s service there in the Air Force, I’ve always been interested in what few films there are about the conflict. As it happens, this is one of the best.

Pork Chop Hill focuses on just a few US Army infantry companies and a few days in the spring of 1953. (By coincidence, the 70th anniversary of the action depicted in this film is this coming week.) As peace negotiations between UN forces and the Communist Chinese and North Koreans drag on elsewhere, American outposts on Pork Chop Hill are overrun and orders come down to Lt Joe Clemons (Gregory Peck) to retake the hill.

The hill is tall and steep and the barbed wire entanglements Clemons’s superiors said had been obliterated by artillery fire are still there when his men finally reach the top. Clemons’s company takes heavy casualties; the men start bleeding away in ones and twos well before they reach the trenches. Motivation and exhaustion pose further problems. Officers and NCOs have to urge their men forward and even to fire their weapons. But properly led—and with ample application of automatic fire and grenades—the GIs retake the trenches and bunkers at the top of the hill bit by bit.

Here Clemons’s depleted company consolidates its control of the hilltop and faces further dangers: friendly fire, Chinese holdouts, repeated communication failures, enemy artillery bombardment, lack of ammunition, lack of food and water, and lack of reinforcements. Even the arrival of another understrength company under Clemons’s brother-in-law, Lt Walter Russell (Rip Torn), proves temporary when Russell’s men are ordered back off the hilltop. Heavy Chinese counterattacks prove harder and harder to repulse and each one leaves Clemons with fewer men. By the end, Clemons and his handful of surviving infantry sit stranded atop the hill, waiting. If the Chinese drag out peace negotiations long enough to retake the hill and if Clemons is not reinforced, he and his men will be annihilated.

Pork Chop Hill is a masterfully crafted, no-frills, no-nonsense war film—a true classic of the genre. It tells a specific, narrowly focused story exceptionally well. This shouldn’t come as a surprise as the director, Lewis Milestone, made his name 29 years earlier with the original screen adaptation of All Quiet on the Western Front. The film is finely staged and shot, balancing the confusion of combat with the coherence necessary to filmmaking in comprehensible but intense combat scenes.

The film also has good performances from an excellent cast. Pork Chop Hill is an amazing who’s-who for movie buffs. In addition to Peck and Torn in the leads (though Torn doesn’t appear until about two-thirds of the way into the film), Martin Landau, George Peppard, Norman Fell, Robert Blake, and Gavin MacLeod play small parts as officers, grunt infantry, and radio men, and the legendary Harry Dean Stanton appears in an uncredited early role. Real-life West Pointer George Shibata plays a Japanese-American officer and Woody Strode stands out as a fearful GI the officers suspect of malingering. Strode’s interaction with James Edwards, a fellow black infantryman who makes it his job to keep an eye on Strode, injects some understated personal and racial drama into the story.

Pork Chop Hill’s technical qualities and its cast are all excellent, but it’s the film’s atmosphere and attention to detail that sells it as a great war film. When Clemons’s company steps off, the march uphill is agonizingly long, and the attempts to breach the Chinese wire frustrating and lethal. The trench warfare is presented matter-of-factly, which only makes it more hair-raising. While there is plenty of rifle and machine gun fire to worry about, artillery and grenades are the real threats. Even throwing a single grenade into an enemy machine gun position can prove hazardous, with one soldier missing and being wounded when his own grenade bounces back and explodes nearby. Less frightening but much creepier is the wry taunting of Chinese political officers via loudspeaker, providing a kind of evil Greek chorus to Clemons’s attacks.

The film also dramatizes the immense difficulty of communication especially well. Clemons has two radio men and uses multiple runners but still can’t relay or receive messages effectively, a problem that only grows worse once he has seized the top of the hill. There is perhaps no better dramatization of Clausewitz’s dictum in On War: “Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.”

In The Mask of Command, the late Sir John Keegan presents case studies in four styles of military leadership: the Heroic (Alexander), the Anti-Heroic (Wellington), the Unheroic (Grant), and the False Heroic (Hitler). One could usefully apply the same taxonomy to war movies. In its straightforward, unassuming presentation; its nuts-and-bolts attention to the work of combat; its stoic, uncomplaining reflection on danger and hardship; and its steadfast refusal to exaggerate either the glories or horrors of war, Pork Chop Hill is the Unheroic war film par excellence. I strongly recommend it.

The film is based on the book of the same name by the influential but controversial Brigadier General SLA Marshall, which he wrote based on after-action interviews with the men involved in the real attacks on Pork Chop Hill. I’m ashamed to say I’ve owned a copy since grad school but never read it. I intend to fix that this weekend.

Clarity and confusion in war movies

Tom Hanks and Gary Sinese in Forrest Gump’s ambush scene

Happy St Valentine’s Day! Let’s talk about war movies.

One of my favorite podcast discoveries last year was School of War, a military history podcast hosted by Marine veteran Aaron MacLean. School of War gets fantastic guests and covers a wide array of topics—just recently I’ve listened to episodes about Gaius Marius, Erich Ludendorff, the Battle of Crécy, the Anglo-Zulu War, and the myth of Spartan invincibility. This morning the show’s latest episode covered “something a little lighter,” as MacLean puts it: the best of American war movies with guest Sonny Bunch, film critic for The Bulwark.

This episode was a great surprise, and exactly the length of my commute this morning. After an initial discussion of what precisely constitutes a “war movie,” MacLean and Bunch talk through a series of great films in chronological order from Last of the Mohicans and Gettysburg (MacLean sounds like he had a childhood very similar to mine) to Zero Dark Thirty and The Outpost. Along the way they consider a lot of recurring themes as well as the manifold problems of telling war stories on film.

One exchange that particularly struck me relates to a tension running through all war movies. MacLean and Bunch raise this topic a couple of times, but perhaps in greatest detail (at approximately 21:00) as they discuss another old favorite of mine, Sergeant York:

Bunch: That is classic [Howard] Hawks, just pure visual storytelling. The sequence where he’s running essentially from, like, hole to hole taking out German forces, you’re never confused about where he is. There’s a perfect spatial understanding of what is happening in the picture. Again, Howard Hawks is one of the greats, and that is a great movie.

MacLean: Which actually—if I may make a thematic observation—is the thing about war movies that is probably, you know, necessary to making a good movie but the least truthful about the actual battlefield. From time to time, you’ll hear people say, you know, who were in combat, “That was just like a movie on some level,” or we’ll get asked, “Is it like the movies?” And the answer is “In some ways Yes and in some ways No,” and the principal way in which it’s “No” is that, in the movies, you know, as you just pointed out, in a good movie you’re not confused about what’s happening in the action. So in, take Black Hawk Down, for example. Right before the RPG hits a truck, what do you see? You see a bad guy on the roof pop out with the RPG launcher and fire the thing. But if you’re in real life, you’re the kid in the truck, you don’t see the guy pop out with the launcher nine times out of ten, you just see Boom! So the actual battlefield is a place of genuine confusion, where a lot of your energy is going into the most simple tasks of, like, Where are they? Who is shooting at me? From where? You know, those things are what you’re spending a lot of your time doing. But if you made the audience do that in a film you would alienate them very quickly. So even in—I’m curious to know your view on this—even in films that—maybe we’ll talk about this one in a minute—like Saving Private Ryan, where famously the chaos of Omaha Beach is a major subject of the film’s first thirty minutes, even there you’re pretty well oriented, actually, as the viewer. You’re not hiding behind something looking at the back of that thing, like, peeking out from time to time trying to figure out what the heck is going on. You actually have a pretty mobile eye that gives you some sense of orientation to what’s happening.

The discussion moves on from there, but MacLean nicely expresses the tension between the needs of film as a medium and the actual experience of combat. Every war movie has to make decisions about how to handle this. The classic war movies often err in the direction of clarity, with alternating scenes of crisp, clearly shot combat and generals pushing flags around a map table. The choice here is explaining a narrative. Alternately, and more rarely, some films err on the side of chaos and bewilderment, but these often do alienate the audience (and, as MacLean and Bunch discuss later, they tend to have explicit political aims). The best war movies manage a little of both.

One that I think balances this expertly is Forrest Gump. Every year in US History II I show my students the film’s Vietnam ambush scene. Among the things it does well:

• the scene goes from tranquil to chaotic instantly;

• Lt Dan’s platoon returns fire—somewhere. Despite the immense firepower they’re spraying out there’s little indication of what they’re shooting at or whether they’re having any effect, and that’s because

• the enemy is invisible. There are muzzle flashes in the distant treeline, and that’s just about it.

After I show this clip, I ask my students how many enemy soldiers they saw in the scene. Very rarely one student will have caught the movement, out of focus in the extreme lower lefthand corner of one shot near the end, of a few VC, though even after viewing it dozens of times myself I’m not sure precisely how many there are. This situation, I explain, was typical. Hollywood action—or the kind of clarity and control you get in Call of Duty—was not.

Anyway, a great discussion in a great episode, and I heartily recommend listening to it. I’ve seldom wanted to jump in and participate in a podcast more. If I could have—and since I’m on the subject anyway—here are two war movies from periods they skipped over that I would strongly recommend:

• Revolutionary War: The Crossing, a cheap TV movie about Washington’s crossing of the Delaware and the Battle of Trenton, but a solid short dramatization that I sometimes show US History I classes.

• Texas Revolution: The Alamo, the Billy Bob Thornton one. I wrote about this some years ago and I show it every time I teach US History I.

In the meantime, MacLean and Bunch have got me wanting to revisit a lot of old favorites. If you need me, I’ll be trying to convince my wife to celebrate St Valentine’s Day with a viewing of Glory.

I’ve written about war movies here plenty of times before. Last summer I considered the difference between Hollywood action and actual combat footage. Two summers ago I considered what “realism” means in a genre often tasked with depicting already unbelievable events. I also reviewed Sergeant York in some detail for the same defunct Historical Movie Monday series in which I reviewed The Alamo back in the first months of this blog.

De Maistre on the fog of war

In a short break from my fall semester prep this morning I went back over my Goodreads highlights in The Executioner, a small selection from arch-conservative reactionary Joseph de Maistre‘s St Petersburg Dialogues. I’d love to run down a complete edition of this late work someday, as in addition to its central subjects de Maistre, the original Trad Chad, also makes characteristically trenchant and incisive remarks on a host of tangential topics.

Here’s one that I’d forgotten about. How, I don’t know, as it’s an observation very close to my personal, artistic, and academic interests:

“People talk a lot about battles without knowing what they are really like.”

— Joseph de Maistre

People talk a lot about battles without knowing what they are really like. In particular, they tend to consider them as occurring at one place, whereas they cover two or three leagues of country. They ask you seriously: How is it that you don’t know what happened in this battle, since you were there? Whereas it is precisely the opposite that would often have to be said. Does the one on the right know what is happening on the left? Does he even know what is happening two paces from him?

De Maistre takes a moment to imagine what it was like:

On a vast field covered with all the apparatus of carnage and seeming to shudder under the feet of men and horses, in the midst of fire and whirling smoke, dazed and carried away by the din of firearms and cannon, by voices that order, roar, and die away, surrounded by the dead, the dying, and mutilated corpses, seized in turn by fear, hope, and rage, by five or six different passions, what happens to a man? What does he see? What does he know after a few hours? What can he know about himself and others? Among this crowd of warriors who have fought the whole day, there is often not a single one, not even the general, who knows who the victor is.

Compare Sir John Keegan’s observations throughout The Face of Battle on the experience versus the reconstructed God’s-eye view of combat, or David Howarth’s imaginative reconstruction of what command and control, much less communication, must have meant during the Battle of Hastings:

How could [Harold Godwinson] have controlled a line eight hundred yards long and eight men deep? How much of it could he have seen, over the heads of the crowd? How long would an order have taken to reach the ends of it—an aide on foot shoving his way through the ranks to search for some captain who was also on foot? Could even a bugle call in those days . . . have carried such a distance among the other sounds of battle?

This principle, evoking “the fog of war,” is applicable from the ranks of foot soldiers and company runners all the way up to commanders of corps and armies. Good histories, military or not, will at least suggest some of this. The most famous example may be Douglas Southall Freeman’s RE Lee, which narrates Lee’s command of the Army of Northern Virginia based only on what he could or did know at any given time. I’ve recently seen some writers criticize or even mock Freeman’s technique, suggesting it is… artificial? too forgiving? something?

I’ve honestly never understood this criticism. If history is to have any meaning or applicability, it needs an understanding of in-the-moment contingency as well as our later omniscience. This, as I posted last week, is the place of imagination in historical study. Fail to imagine how historical figures—whether a private in the front line or a commander at a map table—both did and did not understand what was happening to them, and you will ultimately fail to understand what did happen.

I read The Executioner in an inexpensive Kindle edition from the Penguin Great Ideas series. It’s worth checking out, especially as de Maistre’s work is so hard to find in affordable English editions.